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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES 
Garfield County, by and through counsel, hereby responds to 
the petitions of National Parks and Conservation Association (NPCA) 
and the State of Utah for rehearing in this matter. 
I. PACTS 
1. Garfield County selected an appraiser based on 
requirements imposed by the Division of State Lands and Forestry. 
See, affidavit of Thomas V. Hatch, attached hereto and incorporated 
herein by this reference as Exhibit A. Furthermore, the appraiser 
was selected from names provided by and upon the recommendation of 
the Division. Id. 
2. Garfield County has had no prior or subsequent 
association with the appraiser and had no contact with him other 
than to provide the information requested in the course of the 
appraisal. Id. 
3. The property added to the exchange by Garfield County was 
purchased by the County specifically for the purpose of exchange 
with the state, because the state had indicated its interest in 
obtaining that specific parcel. Id. 
4. There is no evidence in the record of any 
misrepresentation or fraud in the appraisal process or in the 
exchange process as a whole. 
5. The federal-state land exchange legislation has been 
signed by President Clinton. A copy of the legislation is attached 
hereto and incorporated herein by this reference as Exhibit B. 
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II. DISCUSSION 
Garfield County opposes rehearing at this time because, 
without the facts pertaining to the new appraisal, there is not an 
adequate basis for any ruling on the issues raised; the law of 
trusts, as well as the opinion of this Court, do not support a 
holding that the deed is void or voidable; the federal-state land 
exchange, which has been signed into law, is irrelevant to the 
issues of this case; and this Court's opinion on the trustee's duty 
with regard to "noneconomic" values does not require further 
consideration. 
A. THE NEW APPRAISALS MUST BE COMPLETE IN ORDER 
TO ALLOW AN ADEQUATE FACTUAL BASIS FOR ANY 
FURTHER CONSIDERATION OF THIS MATTER BY THIS 
COURT, 
1. Reconsideration without the information 
to be provided bv the independent 
appraisals would be premature. 
The fundamental reason that this Court remanded this matter 
back to the Division of State lands was for the purpose of 
determining "whether the appraised values of section 16 and the 
Garfield County lands offered in exchange represent the full value 
of those lands." National Parks and Conservation Association v. 
Board of State Lands. 215 Utah Adv. Rep. 21 (1993) . The basis for 
this Court's decision was the fact that the appraisal was submitted 
by Garfield County rather than by an appraiser hired by the 
Division. As a result of the procedure used by the Division, which 
this Court found to be inadequate, a new appraisal has been 
ordered. 
There is no evidence, however, that there was any 
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misrepresentation, fraud or bad faith in the procedures adopted by 
the Division. On the contrary, the Division's procedure was based 
solely on its understanding of its duty as trustee, one that has 
now been corrected by this Court. That understanding was clearly 
established in good faith. The record makes it clear that the 
Division was attempting to carry out faithfully its duty as trustee 
to obtain greater than equal value for the lands being exchanged 
and that the Division undertook substantial procedural efforts to 
achieve that goal. 
The evidence also shows that Garfield County did not shop for 
a favorable appraisal, but rather chose an appraiser based solely 
on the requirements of and the recommendation of the Division. The 
County had no prior relationship with the appraiser and did not 
engage in any actions which might have inappropriately influenced 
the appraiser's results. Clearly, Garfield County was acting in 
good faith in this transaction. 
There is ample evidence to suggest that the new appraisal to 
be obtained by the Division would be substantially similar to the 
one obtained by the County, because of the absence of any 
"shopping" or "sharp dealing" by the County. 
Until the new appraisal comes in, there is no basis to 
conclude, one way or another, that the value obtained for the 
property was in any way inadequate, which is the fundamental 
concern expressed by the Court and the applicable case law. 
In the cases cited by this Court in its opinion addressed to 
the trustee's duty to obtain an independent appraisal, the sales in 
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question were not voided* See, Belcher v. Birmingham Trust Natfl 
Bank, 348 F.Supp. 61 (N.D. Ala. 1968); Murohv v. Central Bank & 
Trust, 699 P.2d 13 (Colo. Ct. App. 1985); Hatcher v. United States 
Nafl Bank of Or. . 643 P.2d 359 (Or. Ct. App. 1982); Allard v. 
Pacific Nat'l Bank. 663 P.2d 104 (Wash. 1983). 
In Webb & Knapp, Inc. v. Hanover Bank, 133 A.2d 450 (Md. 
1957), the sale in question required court ratification. In other 
words, that sale had not yet been consummated, since a sale which 
requires court approval amounts only to an offer to purchase. 90 
C.J.S. Trusts § 297 (1955). The Webb & Knapp case, however, 
recites the fundamental principles applicable here: 
If a sale should be made by a conventional 
trustee in good faith and according to his 
best judgment, the sale will not be set aside 
unless there exists an inadequacy of price 
that, under the circumstances, is directly 
attributable to some failure of reasonable 
diligence or effort in the making of the sale. 
. . . [B]oth an inadequacy of price and a 
justifiable expectation of securing a higher 
price must co-exist before a court will set 
aside a contract of private sale made in good 
faith by a conventional trustee in the 
exercise of a discretion which was incident to 
an express power of sale. 
133 A.2d at 456-457, quoting Kramme v. Mewshaw. 147 Md. at 548, 
550-551, 128 A. at 473, 474. 
" [M]ere inadequacy of price, standing alone, is not sufficient 
to vacate a sale, unless it be so gross and inordinate as to 
indicate some mistake or unfairness in the sale for which the 
purchaser is responsible, or misconduct or fraud on the part of the 
trustee making the sale.11 Bovd v. Smith, 96 A. 526 (Md, 1916). 
Clearly, in the absence of the results of the new appraisal, 
there is insufficient factual basis for any decision by this Court 
concerning the status of the transaction, since one of the salient 
facts is whether the price obtained was inadequate. Furthermore, 
in order to invalidate the sale, the Court would also have to 
conclude that the state went beyond mere error in its understanding 
of its obligations as trustee and, in fact, acted in bad faith. 
Furthermore, there may be new issues which arise in the course 
of the second appraisal, which are now unpredictable, but which 
might later require the attention of this Court. The interests of 
judicial economy support a decision to postpone consideration of 
the status of the transaction until all of the facts of the new 
appraisal have been obtained, if at all. This Court's lengthy 
consideration of the issues on appeal should not be reconsidered in 
a piecemeal fashion. 
2. The arguments in favor of rehearing now 
are clearly based upon conjectural 
matters which cannot adequately support a 
further ruling by this Court. 
In addition to the conjectural nature of what the outcome of 
the new appraisal might be, NPCA offers several other conjectural 
bases for rehearing, all insufficient to justify a further delay in 
the remand proceedings pending rehearing. 
NPCA assumes that the appraisal will come in showing a higher 
value for section 16 in comparison to the airport and industrial 
park property which was exchanged for it. Assuming that is true, 
however, there must be further conjecture regarding the decisions 
which might result from that new information. Assuming, arguendo, 
that the value of section 16 is sxibstantially higher in comparison 
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to the property exchanged, we do not know what the parties would 
do. It is possible that negotiations arising based upon the new 
information would lead to an exchange back from the County to the 
state. In that case, the issues pertaining to the validity of the 
deed would be moot. 
NPCA suggests that the Division could allow the County a 
preference "among equally advantageous offers." That proposal, 
alone, clearly reflects the inherent reasons why rehearing should 
not be had. There are no other offers at this time.1 
Consideration of such an issue would be based entirely on 
speculation as to what the relevant factors might be at the time 
the Division obtains the new appraisal. While granting a 
preference to Garfield County has merit, given the facts of this 
matter, there is no reason to address that possibility in a 
rehearing. 
NPCA's proposal that the County be given a preference as 
against other offers is subject to a more serious weakness in the 
context of this case. Current or future offers, six years after 
the exchange, are not relevant to what might have been available at 
the time the exchange took place between the County and the 
Division. It is the fair market value at the time of the exchange 
and the conditions which were known to the trustee at that time 
1Under the federal legislation, there must be appraisals and, 
if the parties are not satisfied, there may be lengthy court 
proceedings to determine fair value. See, Exhibit B. Under the 
circumstances, the possibility of considering the federal-state 
exchange as another "offer" to compare to Garfield Countyfs offer 
is highly speculative. NPCA notes the speculative nature of this 
argument at page 7 of its petition for rehearing. 
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which are the relevant considerations in addressing the trustee's 
duty. See, e.g. . 643 P.2d at 366. This case must focus on the 
duties of the trustee under the circumstances which existed at the 
time of its actions. 
NPCA speculates regarding the County's possible approval of 
federal acquisition if its interest in section 16. NPCA has no 
idea what the County might do. In fact, the County intends to make 
the best decision it can, based upon all relevant facts and law, 
when the information becomes available. From the County's 
perspective, no outcome is foreclosed, including approval of 
federal acquisition of its interest in section 16, except those 
which are precluded by law, policy or rational factual 
considerations. 
One might speculate that the appraisal to be obtained by the 
Division for section 16 could be higher than the appraisals of 
other sections involved in the federal-state exchange. In that 
case, assuming arguendo that the Division has the choice of which 
exchange to pursue, the Division's duty would clearly be to follow 
through with the exchange with the County. 
There are a multitude of considerations which might apply in 
comparing the value to the trust of an exchange of section 16 with 
Garfield County to inclusion of the section in the federal-state 
exchange. These considerations include, for example, the question 
of whether the trust will gain more, over time, from ownership of 
the section by the County than from ownership by the federal 
government, in addition to considering the initial value obtained 
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in either exchange. NPCA is clearly speculating when it supposes 
possible uses of section 16 by Garfield County in support of its 
arguments that the section must be included in the federal-state 
exchange in order to protect the "noneconomic" values which are the 
real focus of its concerns. All of these considerations are 
speculative, at best, compelling a decision not to rehear this 
matter on the basis of such marginal considerations. As noted 
below, this Court has properly chosen not to second-guess the 
Division's treatment of those considerations. 
Fundamentally, however, the considerations applicable to the 
federal-state land exchange just signed into law are not relevant 
to this case. 
B. FEDERAL ACTIONS TAKEN IN 1993 ARE IRRELEVANT 
TO THE ISSUES OF THIS CASE. 
The federal legislation authorizing an exchange with the state 
of Utah has been enacted and signed by the president. Therefore, 
no urgency is posed for consideration by this Court now of issues 
which might affect that legislation. Furthermore, the federal 
legislation is not relevant to the state law issues raised by NPCA 
and by the state and this Court should avoid incorporating 
questions of federal law into this case. 
1. The federal-state land exchange is not 
relevant to this matter. 
The arguments concerning the importance of the federal-state 
land exchange do not have sufficient relevance to this case to 
justify rehearing. As noted above, NPCA posits a series of 
speculative notions to argue the potential relevance of the 
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federal-state exchange to the trusteefs duties in this case. 
However, timing alone is sufficient to render these arguments 
irrelevant. An exchange which was legislated in 1993, six years 
after the exchange of section 16 in 1987, is not relevant to the 
trusteefs duties in 1987. In fact, it is clear from the delay and 
the vagaries of the procedure leading up to the federal-state 
exchange, that rejection of Garfield County's bona fide offer in 
1987 on the basis of the possibility of some form of federal-state 
exchange would have not have been in the best interests of the 
trust. As the legislation makes clear, the state does not know 
today, and may not know for many years, what the value of that 
exchange might be. 
This Court has already addressed the federal-state exchange, 
insofar as it is relevant to this case, when it recognized that the 
Division properly addressed the then-existing facts concerning the 
potential federal-state exchange. 215 Utah Adv. Rep. at 29. 
The remaining issue in this case now focuses on whether the 
value obtained for section 16 was adequate in 1987. The possible 
outcome of the federal-state exchange is clearly not relevant to 
that question. 
2. This court does not have jurisdiction to 
decide the application of the recent 
federal legislation to section 16 and 
should not allow injection of such an 
issue into this case. 
The jurisdictional focus of this Court is on the procedures 
followed by the Division as a matter of state law. The Court's 
decision must be made based upon the law applicable to the state as 
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trustee. It is apparent that the issue of the asserted potential 
for inclusion of this section in the federal-state land exchange, 
insofar as it involves an interpretation of Congress1 intent, is a 
matter of federal law, not cognizable by this Court and not 
properly raised in this matter. 
It is also apparent from the arguments raised by NPCA that if 
this Court were to choose to engage in consideration of the issues 
raised concerning the federal-state land exchange, a substantial 
body of federal legislative history and the factual history 
pertinent to negotiations between the state and other parties to 
effect the federal legislation would have to be addressed. This 
Court should not grant rehearing to consider such a complex matter, 
given its substantive irrelevance to the current status of the 
transaction between Garfield County and the state. 
C. THE LAW OF TRUSTS. AS WELL AS THE EXISTING 
OPINION OF THIS COURT. MAKES IT CLEAR THAT THE 
DEED IS NOT VOID. 
This Court relied on the general law of trusts in determining 
the duties of the state in administering school trust lands. 215 
Utah Adv. Rep. at 28. Based upon that law, the Court determined 
that the Division had a duty to obtain an independent appraisal. 
Id. at 29. 
The breach of that duty, alone, is not sufficient to void the 
action of the trustee, under the case law cited by this Court, as 
outlined in Section II.A.1, above. A conveyance made within the 
valid power of a trustee is valid if the discretion of the trustee 
is honestly and faithfully exercised. "When honestly and fairly 
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made, the sale and conveyance will not be invalidated by conduct 
not amounting to fraud or by minor defects in the proceedings, by 
negligible falsehoods not affecting the results or by subsequent 
acts and events." 90 C.J.S. Trusts § 297 (1955). 
There is no evidence that any of the factors which might 
support invalidation of the deeds of exchange apply in this case. 
To the contrary, the evidence is clear that the breach of duty was 
based upon a good-faith understanding by the Division of its duties 
as trustee and that the actions carried out were all conducted in 
good faith. 
Under the general law of trusts, if, in fact, the trustee 
failed to obtain the greatest possible monetary return for the 
lands, then the trustee may be liable in damages to the trust.2 
The cases relied upon by this Court all provided for damages 
awards. None voided deeds executed in the absence of fraud. 
This Court, likewise, acknowledged, by its framing of its 
decision, that the issue here is not the voidness or voidability of 
the deed, but rather, the amount of money which should have been 
obtained: 
We remand this case to the Division for a 
determination of whether the appraised values 
of section 16 and the Garfield County lands 
offered in exchange represent the full value 
of those lands. 
2That legal principle, alone, argues persuasively that this 
Court should not rehear this matter, but, rather, should wait to 
find out what the new appraisal reveals and what actions the 
parties might take when that information becomes available. If, 
for example, Garfield County were to indemnify the trustee for any 
damages which might be attributable to a breach of duty, the issue 
of damages would be moot. 
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The stay presently in effect will 
continue until the Division makes the 
requisite determinations that the value of the 
land exchanged for section 16 is adequate 
under its trust obligations. 
215 Utah Adv. Rep. at 29. 
Clearly, this Court contemplated the possibility that the 
existing exchange did provide adequate value, thus necessitating no 
further action by the trustee or the County to validate the 
exchange. 
Since the County obtained specific property in Richfield at 
the request of the Division which, along with the airport property 
in Garfield County, has been deeded to the state, it is not just 
the patent to the County which is under consideration heref but 
also the deeds from the County to the state. The issues which 
might be raised in considering voidability of such a transaction 
should be addressed only if necessary after obtaining the necessary 
facts which should be provided by the new appraisals. 
Garfield County included a substantial body of case law in its 
brief on appeal which establishes that the patent in this case 
cannot be invalidated on the facts presented. See, Brief of 
Intervenor, Garfield County, at pp. 16-18, attached hereto as 
Exhibit C. 
Furthermore, under the holdings of this Court, NPCA does not 
have standing to contest the validity of the deed itself. This 
Court held that NPCA has a "limited right of intervention" on the 
issue of whether the state had a duty to obtain independent 
appraisals. 215 Utah Adv. Rep. at 29, n. 11. That issue has been 
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decided. NPCA's standing does not extend to the right to 
"paralyze" government programs dealing with acquisition and 
disposition of property. Id. at 23. 
Given the substantial body of common law applicable to trusts 
which establishes the continued validity of the deed to Garfield 
County and given the clear intent of this Court, no rehearing 
should be granted to determine the validity of the deeds. 
D. THE ISSUE OF THE STATE'S DUTY WITH REGARD TO 
SCHOOL TRUST LANDS IN RELATION TO "NQN-
ECONQMIC" VALUES HAS BEEN THOROUGHLY 
ADDRESSED IN THE COURT'S EXISTING OPINION AND 
SHOULD NOT BE REVISITED. 
This Court has already amply addressed the issues raised by 
NPCA in section II of its petition for rehearing, carefully 
considering the state's duties as trustee in relation to "non-
economic" considerations. It is clear that this Court understood 
the considerations posed by NPCA in the appeal. NPCA's 
dissatisfaction with the result of this decision cannot form a 
valid basis for reconsideration. This Court properly ruled that it 
cannot impose an affirmative duty on the state to look for "non-
economic" options as a priority in conducting an exchange such as 
the one under consideration here. 
III. CONCLUSION 
This Court has ruled that the state had the obligation to get 
the greatest possible monetary return for the school section in the 
exchange with the County. Until the new appraisals tell us whether 
that obligation was, in fact, fulfilled, no further delay of the 
appraisal process should take place to reconsider the issues raised 
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by NPCA and the state. There are substantial legal bases to 
establish that the patent to Garfield County, as well as the deeds 
from the County to the state, are not void or voidable. In the 
event this Court does grant rehearing, Garfield County requests an 
adequate opportunity prior to rehearing to further research and 
brief the issues relevant to voidness or voidability of deeds under 
the applicable law. t^fl^ 
DATED THIS / / day of Octq**£r, 1993. + / 
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WALLACE A. LEE #5306 
Garfield County Attorney 
55 South Main Street 
Panguitch, Utah 84759 
Telephone: (801) 676-2290 
BARBARA G. HJELLE #4597 
Special Counsel to Garfield County 
148 East Tabernacle 
St. George, UT 84770 
(800) 628-7777 
Attorneys for Defendant 
GARFIELD COUNTY 
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
NATIONAL PARKS AND 
CONSERVATION ASSOCIATION, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BOARD OF STATE LANDS and 
PATRICK D. SPURGIN, AS 
DIRECTOR, DIVISION OF STATE 
LANDS AND FORESTRY, 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Respondents, and 
GARFIELD COUNTY, UTAH 
Intervenor. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF GARFIELD ) 
THOMAS V. HATCH, first being duly sworn, deposes and says: 
1. I am the Chairman of the Garfield County Commission. In 
AFFIDAVIT OF THOMAS V. 
HATCH 
Case No. 880022 
that capacity, I conducted the negotiations for the exchange by 
the County of the section of land within Capitol Reef National 
Park ("Switchbacks Section") which is the subject of this action. 
I am competent to testify regarding the matters set forth below 
based upon personal knowledge. Although this affidavit has been 
prepared by counsel for Garfield County, I have carefully 
reviewed and edited the affidavit and its contents correctly 
represent the testimony I would give if called as a witness. 
2. As we entered into negotiations to exchange the 
Switchbacks Section, I was informed by the Land Specialist 
administering that area for the Division of State Lands and 
Forestry that the County would be required to hire an appraiser 
to establish market value for the parcels of property being 
considered for exchange. Since I did not know any appraiser in 
Garfield County, I asked the Division to provide me with the 
names of qualified appraisers to perform this service. 
3. Garfield County then hired Barry Judd, of Kanab, Utah, 
as the appraiser based upon the recommendation of the Division. 
At no time did I or any other Garfield County employee discuss 
the appraisal process with Mr. Judd, other than to provide him 
with information which he requested from us in the course of the 
appraisal process. 
4. No official or employee of Garfield County was or is in 
any way associated with or related to Mr. Judd. 
5. To the best of my knowledge, information and belief, the 
appraisal was conducted in a professional manner, without 
influence or pressure being applied by or bias in favor of or 
against either party to the transaction. 
6. During the course of negotiations, and after the 
appraisal of the first parcels of property suggested for 
exchange, the Division informed the County that additional land 
would be required to ensure that the state received more than 
100% of the market value of the lands being exchanged. 
7. The Division selected the parcel it wanted to add to the 
exchange, specifying a parcel in the industrial park in 
Richfield, Utah, as land it desired to obtain. The County 
entered into an agreement with the owner of that parcel to 
exchange it specifically for the exchange with the state. The 
transaction for that exchange was handled as part of the escrow 
arrangements for the entire exchange; all transactions occurred 
together. The appraisal process was consistent throughout. 
DATED THIS g T ^ day of October, 1993. 
THOMAS V. HATCH, AFFIANT 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF GARFIELD ) 
On this the C> - day of October, 1993, personally appeared 
before me, THOMAS V. HATCH, the affiant in the foregoing 
document, who after being first dulysworn, did acknowledge to me 
that he did sign the same* ,. 
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SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 
This Act may be cited as the "Utah Schools and Lands Improvement Act of 1993r?. 
SECTION 2. UTAH-NAVAJO LAND EXCHANGE. 
(a) ADDITIONS TO RESERVATION.—For the purpose of securing in trust for the 
Navajo Nation certain lands belonging to the State of Utah, which comprise 
approximately thirty-eight thousand five hundred acres of surface and subsurface 
estate, and approximately an additional nine thousand five hundred acres of sub-
surface estate, as generally depicted on the map entitled "Utah-Navajo Land 
Exchange", dated May 18, 1992, such lands are hereby declared to be part of the 
Navajo Indian Reservation in the State of Utah effective upon the completion of 
conveyance from the State of Utah and acceptance of title by the United States. 
(b) AUTHORIZATION.—The Secretary of the Interior is authorized to acquire 
through exchange those lands and interests in lands described in subsection (a) which 
are owned by the State of Utah, subject to valid existing rights. 
SEC. 3. STATE LANDS WITHIN THE GOSHUTE INDIAN RESERVATION. 
(a) ADDITION TO RESERVATION.~--For the purpose of securing in trust for the 
Goshute Indian Tribe certain lands belonging to the State of Utah, which comprise 
approximately nine hundred eighty acres of surface and subsurface estate, and an 
additional four hundred eighty acres of subsurface estate, as generally depicted on 
the map entitled "Utah-Goshute Land Exchange", dated May 18,1992, such lands are 
hereby declared to be part of the Goshute Indian Reservation in the State of Utah 
effective upon the completion of conveyance from the State of Utah and acceptance 
of title by the United States-
(b) AUTHORIZATION.—The Secretary of the Interior is authorized to acquire 
through exchange those lands and interests in lands described in subsection (a) which 
are owned by the State of Utah, subject to valid existing rights. 
(c) OTHER LAND.--(l) The following tract of Federal land located in the State of 
Nevada, comprising approximately 5 acres more or less, together with all 
improvements thereon is hereby declared to be part of the Goshute Indian 
Reservation, and shall be held in trust for the Goshute Indian Tribe: Township 30 
North, Range 69 East, Lots 5, 6, 7, 9, 11, and 14 of Section 34. 
(2) No part of the lands referred to in paragraph (1) shall be used for gaming or any 
related purpose. 
SEC.4. IMPLEMENTATION. 
The exchanges authorized by sections 2 and 3 of this Act shall be conducted without 
cost to the Navajo Nation and the Goshute Indian Tribe. 
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SEC.5. STATE LANDS WITHIN THE NATIONAL FOREST SYSTEM. 
(a) AUTHORIZATION.—The Secretary of Agriculture is authorized to accept on 
behalf of the United States title to the school and institutional trust lands owned by 
the State of Utah within units of the National Forest System, comprising 
approximately seventy-six thousand acres as depicted on a map entitled "Utah Forest 
Land Exchange", dated May 18, 1992. 
(b) STATUS.—Any lands acquired by the United States pursuant to this section shall 
become a part of the national forest within which such lands are located and shall be 
subject to all the laws and regulations applicable to the National Forest System. 
SEC.6. STATE LANDS WITHIN THE NATIONAL PARK SYSTEM. 
(a) AUTHORIZATION,—The Secretary of the Interior is hereby authorized to accept 
on behalf of the United States title to all school and institutional trust lands owned 
by the State of Utah located within all units of the National Park System, comprising 
approximately eighty thousand acres, located within the State of Utah on the date 
of enactment of this Act. 
(b) STATUS.--(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, all lands of the State 
of Utah within units of the National Park System that are conveyed to the United 
States pursuant to this section shall become a part of the appropriate unit of the 
National Park System, and shall be subject to all laws and regulations applicable to 
that unit of the National Park System, 
(2) The Secretary of the Interior shall, as a part of the exchange process of this Act, 
compensate the State of Utah for the fair market value of 580.64 acres within Capitol 
Reef National Park that were conveyed by the State of Utah to the United States on 
July 2,1971, for which the State has never been compensated. The fair market value 
of these lands shall be established pursuant to section 8 of this Act. 
SEC.7. OFFER TO STATE. 
(a) SPECIFIC OFFBKS.—Within 30 days after enactment of this Act, the Secretary 
of the Interior shall transmit to the State of Utah a list of lands, or interests in lands, 
within the State of Utah for transfer to the State of Utah in exchange for the State 
lands and interests described in sections 2, 3, 5, and 6 of this Act. Such list shall 
include only the following Federal lands, or interests therein: 
(1) Blue Mountain Telecommunications Site, fee estate, approximately 640 acres, 
(2) Beaver Mountain Ski Resort Site, fee estate, approximately 3,000 acres, as 
generally depicted on the map entitled "Beaver Mountain Ski Resort" dated 
September 16, 1992. 
(3) The unleased coal located in the Winter Quarters tract. 
(4) The unleased coal located in the Crandall Canyon tract* 
(5) All royalties receivable by the United States with respect to coal leases in the 
Quitchupah (Convulsion Canyon) tract. 
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(6) The unleased coal located in the Cottonwood Canyon tract. 
(7) The unleased coal located in the Soldier Creek tract. 
(b) ADDITIONAL OFFERS.--(l) In addition to the lands and interests specified in 
subsection (a), the Secretary of the Interior shall offer to the State of Utah a portion 
of the royalties receivable by the United States with respect to Federal geothermal, 
oil, gas, or other mineral interests in Utah which on December 31,1992 were under 
lease and covered by an approved permit to drill or plan of development and plan of 
reclamation, were in production, and were not under administrative or judicial 
appeal. 
(2) No offer under this subsection shall be for royalties aggregating more than 50 per 
centum of the total appraised value of the state lands described in sections 2, 3, 5, 
and 6. 
(3) The Secretary shall make no offer under this subsection which would enable the 
State of Utah to receive royalties under this section exceeding $50,000,000, 
(4) If the total value of lands and interests therein and royalties offered to the State 
pursuant to subsections (a) and (b) is less than the total value of the State lands 
described in sections 2, 3, 5, and 6, the Secretary shall provide the State a list of all 
public lands in Utah that as of December 31, 1992, the Secretary in Resource 
Management Plans prepared, pursuant to the Federal Land Policy and Management 
Act of 1976, had identified as suitable for disposal by exchange or otherwise, and 
shall offer to transfer to the State any or all of such lands, as selected by the State, 
in partial exchange for such State lands, to the extent consistent with other 
applicable laws and regulations. 
SEC. 8. APPRAISAL OF LANDS TO BE EXCHANGED. 
(a) EQUAL VALUE,-All exchanges authorized under this Act shall be for equal 
value. No later than 90 days after enactment of this Act, the Secretary of the 
Interior, the Secretary of Agriculture, and the Governor of the State of Utah shall 
provide for an appraisal of the lands or interests therein involved in the exchanges 
authorized by this Act. A detailed appraisal report shall utilize nationally recognized 
appraisal standards including, to the extent appropriate, the Uniform Appraisal 
Standards for Federal Land Acquisition. 
Cb) DEADLINE AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION.-^) If after two years from the date 
of enactment of this Act, the parties have not agreed upon the final terms of some or 
all of the exchanges authorized by this Act, including the value of the lands involved 
in some or all of such exchanges, notwithstanding any other provisions of law, aidj 
a p p r c ^ r m ^ U m t ^ the United 
States District COUIT for the District of Utah, Central Division, shall have jurisdiction 
to hear, determine, and render judgment on the value of any and all lands, or 
interests therein, involved in the exchange. 
2^) No action provided for in this subsection may be filed with the court no sooner 
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than 2 years and later than 5 years after the date of enactment of this Act. Any 
decision of a District Court under this Act may be appealed in accordance with 
applicable laws and rules. 
(c) ADJUSTMENT-If the State shares revenue from the selected federal properties 
the value of such properties shall be the value otherwise established under this 
section, less the percentage which represents the federal revenue sharing obligation, 
but such adjustment shall not be considered as reflecting a property right of the State 
of Utah. 
(d) INTEREST-Any royalty offer by the Secretary pursuant to Subsection 7 (b) shall 
be adjusted to reflect net present value as of the effective date of the exchange. The 
State shall be entitled to receive a reasonable rate of interest at a rate equivalent to 
a five year treasury note on the balance of the value owed by the United States from 
the effective date of the exchange until full value is received by the State and mineral 
rights revert to the United States as prescribed by Subsection 9 (a) (3), 
SEC. 9. TRANSFER OF TITLE. 
(a) TERMS.--(l) The State of Utah shall be entitled to receive so much of those lands 
or interests in lands and additional royalties described in section 7 that are offered 
by the Secretary of the Interior and accepted by the State as are equal in value to the 
State lands and interests described in sections 2, 3, 5, and 6. 
(2) For those properties where fee simple title is to be conveyed to the State of Utah, 
the Secretary of the Interior shall convey, subject to valid existing rights, all right, 
title and interest, subject to the provisions of subsection (b). For those properties 
where less than fee simple is to be conveyed to the State of Utah, the Secretary shall 
reserve to the United States all remaining right, title and interest of the United 
States. 
(3) All right, title, and interest in any mineral rights described in section 7 that are 
conveyed to the State of Utah pursuant to this Act shall revert to the United States 
upon removal of minerals equal in value to the value attributed to such rights in 
connection with an exchange under this Act. 
(4) If the State of Utah accepts the offers provided for in this Act, the State shall 
convey to the United States, subrject to valid existing rights, all right, title and 
interest of the State to all school and institutional trust lands described in sections 
2, 3, 5, and 6 of this Act* Except as provided in section 7(b), conveyance of all lands 
or interests in lands shall take place within 60 days following agreement by the 
Secretary of the Interior and the Governor of the State of Utah, or entry of an 
appropriate order of judgment by the district court. 
(b) INSPECTIONS.-Both parties shall inspect all pertinent records and shall conduct 
a physical inspection of the lands to be exchanged pursuant to this Act for the 
presence of any hazardous materials as presently defined by applicable law. The 
results of those inspections shall be made available to the parties. Responsibility for 
costs of remedial action related to materials identified by such inspections shall be 
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borne by those entities responsible under existing law* 
(c) CONDITIONS.--(l) With respect to the lands and interests described in section 7, 
enactment of this Act shall be construed as satisfying the provisions of section 206(a) 
of the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 requiring that exchanges of 
lands be in the public interest. 
(2) Development of any mineral interest transferred to the State of Utah pursuant 
to this Act shall be subject to all laws, rules, and regulations applicable to 
development of non-Federal mineral interests, including, where appropriate, laws, 
rules, and regulations applicable to such development within National Forests. 
^a | ;n ip^ 
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SEC. 10. LEGAL DESCRIPTIONS. 
(a) IN GENERAL—As soon as practicable after the date of enactment, a map and 
legal description of the lands added to the Navajo and Goshute Indian Reservations 
and all lands exchanged under this Act shall be filed by the appropriate Secretary 
with the Committee on Natural Resources of the United States House of 
Representatives and the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources of the United 
States Senate, and each such map and description shall have the same force and 
effect as if included in this Act, except that the appropriate Secretary may. correct 
clerical and typographical errors in each such legal description and map. Each such 
map and legal description shall be on file and available for public inspection in the 
offices of the Secretary of Agriculture and the Secretary of the Interior and the Utah 
offices of the appropriate agencies of the Department of the Interior and Department 
of Agriculture. 
(b) PILT.-Section 6902(b) of title 31, United States Code, is amended by striking 
"acquisition/1 and inserting in lieu thereof "acquisition, nor does this subsection apply 
to payments for lands in Utah acquired by the United States if at the time of such 
acquisition units, under applicable State law, were entitled to receive payments from 
the State for such lands, but in such case no payment under this chapter with respect 
to such acquired lands shall exceed the payment that would have been made under 
State law if such lands had not been acquired". 
(c) INTENT.-The lands and interests described m section 7 are an offer related only 
to the State lands and interests described in this Act, and nothing in this Act shall 
be construed as precluding conveyance of other lands or interests to the State of Utah 
pursuant to other exchanges under applicable existing law or subsequent Act of 
Congress. It is the intent of Congress that the State should establish a funding 
mechanism, or some other mechanism, to assure that counties within the State are 
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treated equitably as a result of this exchange. 
(d) COSTS.-The United States and the State of Utah shall each bear its own 
respective costs incurred in the implementation of this Act. 
(e) DEFINITION.--As used in this Act, the term "school and institutional trust lands" 
means those properties granted by the United States in the Utah Enabling Act to the 
State of Utah in trust and other lands which under State law must be managed for 
the benefit of the public school system or the institutions of the State which are 
designated by the Utah Enabling Act. 
SEC.ll. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS. 
There are authorized to be appropriated such sums as are necessary to carry out this 
Act. 
TabC 
POINT IV: THE VALIDITY OF THE PATENT TO GARFIELD COUNTY SHOULD BE 
UPHELD, 
As evidenced by the Patent issued by the State of Utah to 
Garfield County, a copy of which is included in the Addendum to 
this Brief, Garfield County is now the owner, in fee simple 
absolute, of the real property which is the subject of this 
action. Petitioner seeks to have that conveyance rescinded by 
this Court in its "Petition for Review". 
As the Supreme Court of Oklahoma declared in Easterlinq 
v. Ferris, 651 P. 2d 677 (Okla. 1982) at 682, "The cancellation 
of a deed is an exertion of the most extraordinary power of a 
court of equity. The power ought not to be exercised except in a 
clear and exceptional case." Furthermore, this Court has held 
that, in order to obtain a decree rescinding a written 
:onveyance, the facts necessary for the allowance of that* .remedy 
aust be proved by clear and convincing evidence, and not by a 
lere preponderance. Sine v. Harper, 118 Utah 415, 222 P. 2d 5 71 
1950) at 580. 
More than a century ago, this Court was asked to decide 
hether a land patent was improperly granted. In Ferry v. 
treet, 4 Utah 521, 7 P. 712 (1885), this Court specifically 
eld, "If, under any assumed state of circumstances a patent can 
£ valid, then it cannot be attacked in any collateral 
roceeding, or in any manner, except by direct action to set 
side the deed indicated, either by the United States, or by the 
arsons who have succeeded to its right." 7 P. at 713. 
imphasis added.) 
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On re-hearing, this Court carefully considered the 
validity of the patent in Ferry v. Street, 4 Utah 521, 11 P. 571 
(1886), and held as follows: 
The decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States 
establish the following propositions of law: First. 
That the various acts of Congress mentioned reserving 
portions of the public lands of the United States to 
the territories or states for the benefit of their 
people, vest the title of such lands so reserved in the 
territories or states when the lands are surveyed, or 
when they are bounded and ascertained. Until such time 
the obligation is executory, and the title remains in 
the federal government. Second. .If the officers of 
the land department had no authority to issue the 
patent, for the reason that there was no law 
authorizing the sale of the land, or that it had been 
reserved for sale, (being identified,) or that the 
title was not in the United States, the patent is void. 
Third. As to all questions of fact which the land 
department is called upon to consider and pass upon 
before issuing the patent, the judgment of that depart-
ment is unassailable, except in a direct proceeding for 
its annulment. Fourth. Among the questions the land 
department is called upon to consider is the character 
of the land, and the class to which it belongs, whether 
agricultural or mineral, and whether it is within a 
town-site. Fifth. ][f the land department had juris-
diction, the law conclusively presumes, in a collateral 
proceeding, the existence OJ£ all circumstances essen-
tial to the validity of the patent"! Unless the patent 
is void, in view of the law, or of circumstances which 
the court may take judicial notice of, it must be held 
valid. All other essential circumstances must be 
presumed to have existed. 11 P. at 576. (Emphasis 
added.) 
The appeal of that case was dismissed by the United 
^ates Supreme Court in Street v. Ferry, 119 U.S. 385 (1886). 
This principle was applied to a patent of state lands 
l Perry v..McConkie, 1 Utah 2d 189, 264 P. 2d 852 (1953), in 
lich this Court held that "an attack on the patent, valid on its 
Lee, ... is reserved unto the sovereign." 264 P. 2d at 854. 
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{Emphasis added. ) Therefore, under Utah law, NPCA has no legal 
basis for a collateral attack upon the Patent in this case. 
The general rule that a patent to land is the highest 
evidence of title, and is immune from collateral attack, prevails 
throughout the Western states. See, e.g., State v. Crawford, 7-
Ariz. App. 551, 441 P. 2d 586 (Ariz. App. 1968); Ashley v. 
Hill, 150 Colo. 563, 375 P. 2d 337 (Colo. 1962); Dredge Corp. v. 
Husite Co. , 78 Nev. 69, 369 P. 2d 676 (Nev. 1962); cert, denied, 
371 U.S. 821 (1962); Bustamante v. Sena, 92 N.M. 72, 582 P. 2d 
1285 (N.M. 1978); See generally, 63A Am. Jur. 2d Public Lands, 
Sections 74-76 (1984), pp. 572-574. 
In addition to the fact that, under a century of 
precedent by this Court, NPCA has no legal basis for a collateral 
attack upon the validity of the Patent in this case, there are 
compelling policy reasons why the validity of the Patent should 
De upheld in this case. The State of Utah, as the holder of 
leeds to the real property which was conveyed to the State by 
Garfield County last year, has undoubtedly received the benefits 
Df and profits from the use of those lands, and may well have 
ilready included those lands in management plans and contractual 
irrangemants with third peurtles, in rellancQ upon the subject 
exchange. There is no clear and convincing evidence before this 
lourt which would warrant the rescission of those conveyances, 
Jid the violation of any contractual arrangements which may have 
een made in reliance thereon. The "Petition for Review" should 
e dismissed, with prejudice. 
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